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WHY (AND WHEN) JUDGES DISSENT:
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner*
Abstract
This paper develops and tests a model of self‐interested judicial behavior to explore the pheno‐
menon of judicial dissents, and in particular what we call “dissent aversion,” which sometimes
causes a judge not to dissent even when he disagrees with the majority opinion. We examine dis‐
sent aversion using data from both the federal courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. Our
empirical findings are consistent with the predictions of the model. In the court of appeals, the
frequency of dissents is negatively related to the caseload and positively related to ideological
diversity among judges in the circuit and circuit size (i.e., the fewer the judges, the greater the
collegiality costs of dissenting and therefore, other things being equal, the fewer dissents). We
also find that dissents increase the length of majority opinions (imposing collegiality costs by
making the majority work harder) and are rarely cited either inside or outside the circuit (reduc‐
ing the value of dissenting to dissenters). In the Supreme Court, we find that the dissent rate is
negatively related to the caseload and positively related to ideological differences, that majority
opinions are longer when there is a dissent and that dissents are rarely cited in either the courts
of appeals or the Supreme Court.

I. INTRODUCTION
Following earlier work analyzing judicial behavior from an economic (ra‐
tional‐choice) standpoint,1 we test a model of self‐interested judicial behavior.
We assume, plausibly in the case of federal judges, who enjoy life tenure (and
our empirical analysis is limited to such judges), that judges have leisure prefe‐
rence or, equivalently, effort aversion, which they trade off against their desire to
have a good reputation and to express their legal and policy beliefs and prefe‐
rences (and by doing so perhaps influence law and policy) by their vote, and by
the judicial opinion explaining their vote, in the cases they hear. We use this
model to explore the phenomenon of judicial dissents, and in particular what we
* We thank Laura Bishop, Ralph Dado, Brian Darsow, Justin Ellis, Benjamin Foster, and Sonia
Lahr‐Pastor for their excellent research assistance. Epstein thanks the National Science Founda‐
tion, and Landes and Posner thank the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at the Uni‐
versity of Chicago Law School, for financial support
1 For example, Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 35–39 (2008); Posner, “What Do Judges and
Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does),” 3 Supreme Court Economic Review 1
(1993); Gordon Foxall, “What Judges Maximize: Toward an Economic Psychology of the Judicial
Utility Function,” 25 Liverpool Law Review 177 (2005); Richard S. Higgins and Paul H. Rubin,
“Judicial Discretion,” 9 Journal of Legal Studies 129 (1980).
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call “dissent aversion,”2 which sometimes causes a judge not to dissent even
when he disagrees with the majority opinion.
We examine dissent aversion in both the federal courts of appeals and the
U.S. Supreme Court, using it for example to explain the well‐documented panel‐
composition effect on judicial decisions in the U.S. courts of appeals.3 We show
that the effect, though typically attributed to the power of judges with extreme
conservative or liberal views to influence more moderate judges to vote with
them, can be explained in terms of self‐interested behavior that is independent of
the influence of other judges.
A dissent in the court of appeals increases the length of the majority opinion
by about 20 percent, which we treat as a rough measure of the cost that a dissent
imposes on the majority. Dissents are rarely cited either inside or outside the cir‐
cuit.4 (Citations are a proxy for influence and therefore of a benefit of dissenting.)
A dissent increases the likelihood (though it remains very small) that the Su‐
preme Court will grant certiorari in the case—a potentially major benefit from a
dissent. We use regression analysis to test the hypothesis that the frequency of
dissents in a circuit is negatively related to the circuit’s caseload (which influ‐
ences the opportunity cost of dissenting), and positively related to the number of
judges (the greater the number, the lower the collegial cost of dissenting) and
ideological differences among judges in the circuit, which increases the likelih‐
ood of disagreement among judges on a panel, though, because of dissent aver‐
sion, disagreement does not automatically generate a dissent. We also explore
the impact on dissenting of the division of the Fifth circuit into two circuits, the
Fifth and the Eleventh, in 1981.

2 Posner, How Judges Think, note 1 above, at 31–34, introduced the term and presented a brief,
informal model.
3 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal
Judiciary (2006); Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist, and Wendy L. Martinek, Judging on a
Collegial Court (2006); Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2007); Joshua B.
Fischman, “Decision‐Making under a Norm of Consensus: A Structural Analysis of Three‐Judge
Panels” (Tufts University, Dept. of Economics, May 2, 2007); Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Til‐
ler, “Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal
Courts of Appeals,” 107 Yale Law Journal 2155, 2175–2176 (1998).
4 The court of appeals data on word length and citations come from a random sample of 1025
published opinions (about 30 per circuit excluding the federal circuit) in the 1989–1991 period.
The sample includes 80 dissenting opinions (less than 8 percent). We selected the 1989–1991 pe‐
riod so that we could obtain a nearly complete history of citations to each majority and dissenting
opinion, since nearly all citations to an opinion occur within 20 years after it is decided. Our data
come from the U.S. Court of Appeals Database compiled by Donald R. Songer and updated by
Ashlyn K. Kuersten and Susan B. Haire. We excluded 58 opinions because of coding errors in the
Songer database (see Appendix B in William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, “Rational Judicial
Behavior: A Statistical Study,” 1 Journal of Legal Analysis 775 (2009), and 7 en banc decisions.
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We study a sample of all Supreme Court opinions in the 1963, 1980, and 1990
terms—chosen so that we would have opinions in three different chief justice‐
ships, those of Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist. There were dissenting opinions in
62 percent of the cases in our sample.5 We find that majority opinions are longer
when there is a dissent and that dissents are rarely cited in either the courts of
appeals or the Supreme Court.6 The first finding supports the hypothesis that
dissents impose costs on nondissenting judges (and therefore impose collegiality
costs on the dissenter), and the second that it yields minimal benefits (as proxied
by number of citations) to a dissenter. We also use regression analysis to estimate
the impact of changes in the Supreme Court’s caseload and ideological differenc‐
es among the Justices on the frequency of dissenting and concurring opinions.
We find support for the hypothesis that the dissent rate is negatively related to
caseload and positively related to ideological differences.
II. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF DISSENT AVERSION
A. The Cost of Dissenting
Judges are assigned majority opinions to write and must do so in order to
remain in good standing, but there is no requirement of dissenting. Since writing
a dissenting opinion requires effort, which is a cost, a judge will not dissent un‐
less he anticipates a benefit from dissenting that offsets his cost. An obvious ben‐
efit is to undermine the influence of the majority opinion, with which by assump‐
tion he disagrees, although possible offsets are that a dissent will draw attention
to the majority opinion and may magnify the opinion’s significance by exagge‐
rating its potential scope in order to emphasize the harm that it will do.
Dissenting imposes an effort cost on the majority as well and sometimes a
reputation cost too, if the dissenting opinion criticizes the majority forcefully. To
minimize the dissenter’s criticisms and retain the vote of the other judge in the
majority (in a panel of three judges, the normal number of judges who decide a
case in the federal courts of appeals), the author of the majority opinion often
will revise his opinion to meet, whether explicitly or implicitly, the points made
by the dissent. The effort involved in these revisions, and the resentment at criti‐
cism by the dissenting judge, may impose a collegiality cost on the dissenting
judge by making it more difficult for him to persuade judges to join his majority

5 We excluded from our sample 5 cases decided by an equally divided vote and 11 cases in which
there was no majority opinion.
6 Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, note 3 above, at 174, using a different data‐
set, also finds that majority opinions in cases in which there is a dissent are longer than majority
opinions when there is no dissent.
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opinions in future cases.7 This assumes that judges do not consider such costs as
bygones to be ignored in future interactions with the dissenter. By withholding
or reducing collegiality in the future, the judges in the majority punish the dis‐
senter, which may deter him from dissenting in some future case. We predict
that dissents will be less frequent in circuits that have fewer judges because any
two of its judges will sit together more frequently and thus have a greater incen‐
tive to invest in collegiality.8
The effort cost of writing a dissent will tend to be greater the heavier the
court’s caseload;9 likewise the ill will generated by a dissent. We therefore expect
that other things being equal, dissents will be less frequent the heavier a court’s
caseload. The Supreme Court’s caseload is lighter than that of the courts of ap‐
peals, and workload as well, even taking account of the greater importance of the
Court’s cases and the fact that the Court has a heavy burden of screening cases to
decide which ones to hear. On average a Supreme Court Justice writes only 8 to
10 majority opinions a year, compared to a mean of 54 for a court of appeals
judge.10
B. The Benefits of Dissenting
We assume that the benefit of dissenting derives from the influence of the
dissenting opinion and the enhanced reputation of the judge who writes the dis‐
sent. We proxy this benefit by the number of citations to the dissenting opinion.
If dissenting opinions are rarely cited, this suggests that the benefits from dis‐
senting are small. Another possible benefit from dissenting in a court of appeals
is that the Supreme Court is more likely to grant certiorari in a case in which
there is a dissent.11 The added benefit is likely to be small, however, because the
Supreme Court grants certiorari in only a tiny fraction of cases.
Our focus on influence obscures the fact that some judges can be expected to
exhibit dissent preference rather than dissent aversion. There is a self‐expressive
character to a judicial opinion as well as its instrumental effect in resolving the
7 See, for example, Collins J. Seitz, “Collegiality and the Court of Appeals: What Is Important to
the Court as an Institution is the Quality of the Working Relationship among Its Members,” 75
Judicature 26, 27 (1991).
8 Stefanie A. Lindquist, “Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and Effects of Deci‐
sion‐Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts,” 41 University of Richmond Law Review 659,
695–696 and tab. 5 (2007).
9 Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek, note 3 above, at 61, advance a similar hypothesis.
10 See www.uscourts.gov/cgi‐bin/cmsa2008.pl. 54 is the number of signed opinions for judges
active during 2008.
11 Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, "Sophisticated Voting and GateKeeping in the Supreme Court, 15 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 549 (1999); Ryan C.
Black & Ryan J. Owens, "Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence," 71 Journal of Politics 1062 (2009).
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case at hand and influencing the course of the law. A judge who derives great
utility from expressing his views may, especially if he finds himself on a court in
which his views are shared by few of the other judges, derive a benefit from fre‐
quent dissenting that exceeds the cost he incurs in effort and in loss of collegiali‐
ty.
The benefits of dissenting are affected by caseload. The heavier a court’s ca‐
seload, the less likely it is to reexamine its precedents, because a decision in ac‐
cordance with precedent reduces the effort cost of judicial decision making, and
also the size of the caseload by making the law more predictable. The less likely
the court is to reexamine its precedents, the less of an effect a dissenting opinion
is likely to have, since the majority opinion will be a precedent and therefore un‐
likely to be reexamined.
The Supreme Court’s lighter caseload should make the Court more willing to
reexamine precedents, and this should increase the benefit to Supreme Court Jus‐
tices of dissenting. The lighter caseload also reduces the opportunity cost of dis‐
senting in the Supreme Court, especially since, despite the lighter load, the Jus‐
tices have more support staff: the ratio of law clerks to Justices is higher than the
ratio of law clerks to court of appeals judges. And because precedents are inhe‐
rently less authoritative in the Supreme Court than in lower courts—owing to the
political nature of so many of the Court’s cases and the fact that no higher court
can discipline the Supreme Court’s decision making—the Justices are likely to
chafe at having to follow precedents created by their predecessors. (Justice Tho‐
mas has made clear that he does not follow precedent.) Along similar lines, in
many Supreme Court cases the orthodox legal materials are unlikely to deter‐
mine the outcome, so judges fall back on ideology or other nonlegalistic decision
drivers, and there is more divergence among judges in such drivers than there is
in narrowly legal reasoning. Finally, since dissents are positively related to disa‐
greement, and there is more room for disagreement in a court of nine judges than
in one of three (most court of appeals decisions are decided by a panel of three),
we expect more dissents the more judges who hear a case.
On the other hand, one might expect the collegiality costs of dissenting to be
greater in the Supreme Court than in any circuit because the Justices sit with
each other in every case, whereas court of appeals judges, especially in the larger
circuits, sit with a given colleague rather infrequently. One might think the very
high rate of dissents in the Supreme Court would make life unbearable, driving
up dissent aversion. In fact, studies of the Supreme Court identify periods in
which the Justices have very poor relations with each other (the 1940s for exam‐
ple, and the Burger Court years in the 1970s and 1980s until Burger’s retirement),
and other times in which they have good relations, such as at present, and these
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fluctuations in collegiality do not appear to be related to the frequency of dis‐
sents.
This suggests that judicial collegiality depends on other factors besides dis‐
sents. Indeed, the more judges sit with each other, the more that differences in
personality, work habits, and so on create a potential for irritation. But insofar as
dissents are a source of collegiality costs, the magnitude of those costs may de‐
pend critically on workload. If a court has a very light workload, so that the costs
of a dissent to a judge in the majority are slight, he will probably not to be greatly
irritated by the dissent; the dissent will be imposing only a slight cost on him.
This may be why the frequency of dissent in the Supreme Court appears not to
influence the collegiality of the Justices.
We therefore predict, and we find, a higher dissent rate in the Supreme
Court than in the courts of appeals. In fact a much higher rate: as shown in Fig‐
ure 1, it is 62 percent in the Supreme Court and only 2.6 percent in the courts of
appeals.12
Concurring opinions, like dissents, arise from disagreement, albeit disa‐
greement about reasoning rather than outcome. As one would expect, they are
much more frequent in the Supreme Court than in the courts of appeals. In the
period 1953–2008, there were one or more concurring opinions in 40.3 percent of
Supreme Court cases, compared to a minuscule .6 percent in our sample of pub‐
lished court of appeals decisions in the 1989–1991 period.
Figure 1
C. Panel‐Composition Effects
Previous work has demonstrated that a court of appeals panel in which the
judges were not all appointed by a president of the same party is likely to decide
a politically controversial case, such as a sex discrimination case or an abortion
case, differently from a panel all of whose judges were appointed by a president
of the same party.13 And a panel in a sex discrimination case in which all the
judges are male is likely to decide the case differently from a panel that contains

12 We counted the number of opinions with dissents in the 1990 to 2007 period in both Lexis
(13,288 dissents) and West (12,909 dissents). The denominator is the number of cases terminated
on the merits, which is close to terminations with an opinion but also includes some cases termi‐
nated without an opinion because of abandonments, settlements, and jurisdictional flaws. This
figure rises to 7.8 percent in a random sample of 1025 court of appeals published opinions in the
years 1989–1991
13 See references in note 3 above.
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a female judge,14 but our focus will be on the effects of panel composition on
ideological voting.
Why might panel composition have this curious effect—why, that is, would
a majority ever yield to the wishes of the minority? One possibility is that the
odd man out acts as a whistleblower.15 Another is that he may bring to the pan‐
el’s deliberations insights that the other judges, with their presumably different
priors based on political ideology or their different life experiences correlated
with gender, may have overlooked. But a bigger factor may be differences
among panel members in intensity of preference for a particular outcome,16
coupled with dissent aversion. If one judge feels strongly that the case should be
decided one way rather than another, while the other two judges, though in‐
clined to vote the other way, do not feel strongly, one of those two may decide to
go along with the third to avoid creating ill will, perhaps hoping for reciprocal
consideration in some future case in which he has a strong feeling and the other
judges do not. Once one judge swings over to the view of the dissentient judge,
the remaining judge is likely to do so as well, for similar reasons or because of
dissent aversion.17
Of course, a judge who disagrees strongly with the majority may end up dis‐
senting if he fails to persuade a member of the majority to switch his vote. Pre‐
sumably the greater the ideological differences among judges in a circuit, other
things being equal, the more likely are members of a panel to disagree about the
correct outcome and therefore the higher the dissent rate can be expected to be in
that circuit. We test this hypothesis in our empirical analysis.
Ideological disagreement is unlike a disagreement over the best means to a
shared end because ideological disputants rarely argue from shared premises. A
liberal on a panel with two conservatives is unlikely to produce facts or argu‐
14 Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, and Andrew D. Martin, “Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex
on Judging,” American Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).
15 Cross and Tiller, note 3 above.
16 As proxied by the ideological distance between the dissenting judge and his majority col‐
leagues with respect to the particular case. The greater the distance, the likelier a dissent. Virginia
A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist, and Wendy L. Martinek, “Separate Opinion Writing on the
United States Courts of Appeals,” 31 American Politics Research 215 (2003).
17 A small literature in political science examines vote “fluidity” on the Supreme Court, which
occurs when a Justice changes his vote between the initial conference vote and publication of the
opinion. The most recent study shows that in the 1969‐1985 terms at least one Justice changed his
vote in 36.6% of the cases, though an individual Justice switched, on average, in just 7.5% of the
cases. Generally the switchers joined the majority (what political scientists term “conformity vot‐
ing”) rather than the dissenters. Justice White provides an example. When he initially cast his
vote with the majority, he ultimately joined the dissenters only 3.3% of the time but when he in‐
itially voted with the minority he moved to the majority in 22.5% of the cases. Forrest Maltzman
& Paul J. Wahlbeck, “Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court,”
90 American Political Science Review 581 (1996).
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ments to change the ideology of his colleagues, or vice versa. But if he feels more
strongly about how the case should be decided than the other judges do, this im‐
plies that he would derive greater benefits than they from a decision of the case
his way and therefore that he would be willing to incur greater costs to get his
way, as by writing a dissent. His threat to dissent is thus a credible threat to im‐
pose costs on his colleagues (the costs arising from their dissent aversion) if they
refuse to yield to his preference. If those costs exceed the benefits to at least one
of his colleagues of deciding the case his preferred way because he does not feel
strongly about the outcome, that colleague will give way.
Jury holdouts are a parallel phenomenon. A juror who feels very strongly
about what the verdict in the case should be will be willing to incur costs by pro‐
tracting the jury’s deliberations. By thus imposing costs on the majority he may
induce the jurors in the majority to yield to him, compromise with him, or report
to the judge that the jury is hung. The requirement (not always imposed in civil
cases any longer) that a jury verdict be unanimous strengthens the holdout’s
hand relative to that of the dissentient judge on a three‐judge panel. The normal
pressures to conform to prevailing views in social settings,18 including jury deli‐
berations, are weaker in appellate panels because of the long and honorable tra‐
dition of dissent.
But while requiring unanimity strengthens the hand of the holdout juror, his
hand is weakened by the fact that the other jurors can, at low cost, walk away
from the case by declaring the jury hung, in which event there will be a new trial
at which the side favored by the current holdout is quite likely to lose. The ma‐
jority of the new jury probably will favor the other side just as the majority of the
first jury did, and a holdout is unlikely the next time because holdouts are rare.
D. A Formal Model of Dissent Aversion
We present a model of judicial voting in which a judge’s vote in a particular
case depends on his view of the applicable law and precedents, his ideological
leanings, and the interaction between the ideological make‐up of the other judges
on the panel and his willingness to dissent (the converse of dissent aversion) if he
disagrees with the majority’s decision. We distinguish between judges appointed
by Republican presidents and judges appointed by Democratic ones, and assume
that the former tend to favor conservative outcomes and that the latter tend to
favor liberal outcomes.
We use CR and CD to denote the probability that a judge appointed by a Re‐
publican (R) and a judge appointed by a Democratic (D) will favor a conservative
18 On these “uniformity pressures,” see, for example, Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett, The Person
and the Situation: Perspectives on Social Psychology 27–46 (1991).
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outcome in a case in which 1 > CR > CD > 0. We ignore case outcomes in which
there are no ideological stakes or mixed ideological stakes. We use VR and VD to
denote the probability that the judge actually votes for a conservative outcome.
The probability depends not only on CR and CD but also on panel composition,
the likelihood that the judge will disagree with the majority, and his willingness
to dissent if he disagrees. Thus,
(1)

VR = R(CR) + (1‐R)[CD(1 ‐ ) + CR]

(2)

VD = D(CD) + (1‐D)[CR(1 ‐ ) + CD]

R and (1‐R) are the fractions of panels with a majority of Republican and Demo‐
cratic appointees, respectively, when the judge in question is a Republican ap‐
pointee; D and (1‐D) the fractions when the parties are reversed; and  the wil‐
lingness of a judge to dissent. Thus,  equals 1 minus a judge’s dissent aversion
that is strong enough to make him decide not to dissent even if he disagrees with
the majority. Another way to think of  is as the percentage of cases in which a
judge disagrees with the majority and actually dissents. We assume that mem‐
bers of a panel are chosen randomly from the judges of the court, which is the
practice in all circuits.19 (We ignore visiting judges.)
To simplify the analysis, we assume that  is the same for all judges and that
(3)

 = (N, X/N, z)

where N is the number of judges in a circuit, X/N the circuit’s average caseload,
and z other factors influencing . We expect that the greater N is, the lower will
be the collegiality costs and the greater, therefore, the willingness to dissent
(/N > 0), and that the greater X/N is, the greater are the marginal effort and
collegiality cost of a dissent and hence the lower the incentive to dissent
(/(X/N) < 0).
Because there are no panel‐composition effects in the Supreme Court (ignor‐
ing cases in which one or more Justice is recused or ill), equations (1) and (2)
simplify to VR = CR and VD = CR(1 ‐ ) + CD in that Court, assuming that Justices
appointed by a Republican president are in the majority and therefore that R = 1
and D = 0. If  is close to one (meaning that dissent aversion is  0) in the Su‐
preme Court, as we believe it is for reasons noted earlier, then both Republican
Matthew Hall, "Experimental Justice: Random Judicial Assignment and the Partisan Process of
Supreme Court Review," 37 American Politics Research 195 (2009). See also Boyd, et al., note 15
above, which reports results consistent with random assignment.
19
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and Democratic appointees always vote according to their true ideological prefe‐
rences, CR and CD.
E. Implications for Judicial Voting Behavior
Although  denotes willingness to dissent, the fraction of actual dissents will
be lower. Consider a judge, appointed by a Republican president, whose  is 25
percent if he finds himself in disagreement with the other judges on the panel
when they are both appointees of a Democratic president. Assume his court has 4
judges beside himself who were appointed by a Republican president and 7 who
were appointed by a Democratic President. On average, in 38 percent of his cases
he will be the only R on the panel.20 Assume further that there is such a wide
ideological gap between Rs and Ds that CR and CD are .7 and .3 respectively. This
implies that an R and a D will disagree 40 percent of the time, and since  is 25
percent R will dissent in 10 percent of the cases (40 percent of 25 percent) in
which he is the minority member of a panel.
His overall dissent rate, however, will be lower than that because he also sits
on panels in which he is in the majority. In our example an R will dissent only 3.8
percent of the time because he sits on a panel with two Ds only 38 percent of the
time and dissents in only 10 percent of the cases decided by that panel. In con‐
trast, a D in our example will have a dissent rate of 1.8 percent because he sits
with two Rs in only 18.1 percent of the cases.
The average dissent rate for all the judges in our example is the weighted av‐
erage of the dissent rates of the 5 Rs and the 7 Ds, and is therefore 2.6 percent,
which is much lower than the  of 25 percent rate that we started with.
The number of dissents as a fraction of decided cases is three times the frac‐
tion of dissenting votes (the 2.6 percent number above) because there are three
votes in each case. So if each judge hears 100 cases a year, this amounts to 1200
cases in a 12‐judge circuit, 3600 total votes, and 94 dissenting votes, or 7.8 dis‐
sents per 100 decided cases.
Table 1 illustrates how the dissent rate can be expected to change as panel
composition, dissent aversion, and the ideological gap between Rs and Ds
changes, in a hypothetical 12‐judge circuit, assuming that a judge dissents only
when he is sitting with two judges appointed by a president of the opposite party
from the one who appointed him. If, for example, there are 10 Rs and 2 Ds in the
court, an R will sit with two Ds only 1.8 percent of the time, while a D will sit
with two Rs 81.8 percent of the time. As we see in columns (5) and (6) in the ta‐
ble, assuming that a judge in the minority disagrees with the majority 40 percent
20 The probability that the R will sit with two Ds is (7 x 6)/(11 x 10) = 42/110 = .38, and the proba‐
bility that he will sit with one or two other Rs is therefore 1 ‐ .38.
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of the time and dissents in 25 percent of those cases, the Rs will dissent in only .2
percent of the cases and the Ds in 8 percent. In contrast, in the (shaded) row in
the table, in which the number of Rs and Ds is equal, the dissent rate of both Rs
and Ds will be 2.7 percent.
Table 1
If the ideological gap between Rs and Ds declines, so will the fraction of po‐
tential disagreements and therefore the dissent rate even if dissent aversion and
panel composition are unchanged. For example, if the ideological variables CR
and CD are .6 and .4 rather than .7 and .3, the ideological gap will decline from .4
to .2, meaning that an R and a D will disagree in 20 percent rather than 40 per‐
cent of the cases in which they are on the same panel. This will cause the dissent
rate to fall by one‐half (compare columns (7) and (9)), but it will remain low for
the individual judge even if dissent aversion vanishes (=1), as in column (10)
and the circuit is evenly balanced between Rs and Ds (which maximizes the frac‐
tion of mixed panels and hence the opportunity to dissent). On these assump‐
tions a judge will dissent in only 5.4 percent of the cases (.2 x .272), though there
will be a dissent in 16.3 percent (3 x 5.4) given an equal number of Rs and Ds.
The assumption in equations (1)–(3) and Table 1 that a judge will dissent on‐
ly if he is an R or a D on a panel in which the two other judges were appointed
by a president of a different party from him yields testable hypotheses regarding
the effects of dissent aversion, panel composition, and ideological differences but
is unrealistic, as is the assumption that all Ds are liberal in all cases and all Rs
conservative in all cases.21 In reality there will be cases in which (1) a judge will
dissent even if the panel consists of all Rs or all Ds, or (2) one member of the
panel (or two members) will switch his (their) vote to support the potential dis‐
senter who feels more strongly about the case than either of the other judges, or
(3) the majority will narrow the grounds of the decision, or soften the language of
the opinion, to accommodate the concerns of the third judge and thereby head
off a dissent.22 (1) will increase the dissent rate; (2) will leave it unchanged if one
judge switches his vote and reduce it if both do; (3) will reduce it.

21 See Lee Epstein and Gary King, “The Rules of Inference,” 69 University of Chicago Law Review 1,
88–96 (2002).
22 Sunstein et al., note 2 above, at 20–21 (tab. 2–1), present evidence of ideological “moderation of
the majority position when a panel contains two rather than three judges appointed by a presi‐
dent of the same party.ʺ
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F. Observed Voting and True Ideological Preferences
The combined effect of dissent aversion and ideological diversity is to make
a judge’s voting behavior less ideological, implying that VR < CR and VD > CD—
that is, that the difference between the actual votes of Rs and Ds will be smaller
than would be predicted on the basis of their being Rs or Ds. We therefore re‐
write the equations for the judge’s voting behavior ((1) and (2)) as a weighted av‐
erage of his ideology and the ideology of the judges in his circuit who were ap‐
pointed by a president of the opposite party, with the weights depending on
both the ideological composition of panels and dissent aversion. Thus:
(4)

VR = CR(R + (1‐R)) + CD(1‐R)(1 ‐ )

(5)

VD = CD(D + (1‐D)) + CR(1‐D)(1 ‐ )

Ideological moderation will be observed in (4) and (5) if a judge gives a positive
weight to the ideology of judges of the opposite ideology, provided that the
judge has at least some dissent aversion. But if he has absolute dissent aversion
( = 0), his vote will be strongly influenced by panel composition. As shown in
column (4) of Table 2, a D in a court composed of 10 Rs and 2Ds will look much
like an R because 62.7 percent of his votes will be conservative, although if he
gave free rein to his own ideological preference he would vote conservative in
only 30 percent of his.
Table 2
We can think of  = 1 as a benchmark—how a judge would vote if he always
dissented when he disagreed with the other judges on the panel. How a judge
does vote (VR and VD above) will depend on dissent aversion (how far  is below
1; the composition of the panel, which depends on the number of Rs and Ds in a
circuit; and the ideological distance between the Ds and Rs.
Notice in Table 2 that as the ratio of Rs to Ds falls, all the judges vote less
conservatively, holding constant both  (provided  < 1) and a judge’s own ideol‐
ogy. This is a pure panel effect and implies that comparing the voting behavior of
judges in courts that have different ratios of Rs to Ds can yield misleading infe‐
rences concerning a judge’s ideology. For example, in Table 2, an R in a court
with 3 Rs and 9 Ds will appear to be less conservative than a D in a court of 10 Rs
and 2 Ds if  is less than or equal to .25.
This in turn suggests that a judge’s overall voting record in the court of ap‐
peals may be a poor predictor of how he will vote if he or she is later appointed
to the Supreme Court, because dissent aversion is weak in the Supreme Court
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and panel‐composition effects nonexistent. We can illustrate this point for cur‐
rent Supreme Court justices who served on the court of appeals. The fraction of
conservative votes in a sample of civil cases in the courts of appeals for court of
appeals judges later appointed to the Supreme Court are (number of votes in pa‐
rentheses): Breyer .592 (103); Ginsburg .371 (97); Stevens .372 (43); Alito .386 (44);
Kennedy .421 (19); and Scalia .571 (35).23 These numbers are only weakly related
to the fraction of conservative votes of these judges in the Supreme Court: Breyer
.365; Ginsburg .309; Stevens .307; Alito .775; Kennedy .641; and Scalia .768. The
data are also roughly consistent with the hypothesis that panel effects influence
court of appeals voting. Scalia and Kennedy sat with a majority of Democratic
appointees in the court of appeals and voted more liberally than they did in the
Supreme Court. Stevens and Ginsburg also sat with a Democratic majority in the
court of appeals and voted liberally in both the appellate court and Supreme
Court. Breyer sat with a Republican majority in the first circuit and voted more
conservatively in the appellate court than Supreme Court. The only anomaly is
Alito, who sat with a majority of Republican appointees yet so far has voted
more liberally in the court of appeals than in the Supreme Court.24
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. The Cost of Dissent
A dissent imposes an effort cost on the majority because the author of the
majority opinion is likely to revise his opinion to address the objections raised by
the dissent. This suggests that majority opinions will be longer when there is a
dissent. We collected data on the number of words in our sample of 446 Supreme
Court opinions and 1025 court of appeals opinions.25
In the Supreme Court sample there are 202 cases with one dissenting opinion
(45.3 percent), 60 (13.5 percent) with two or more dissenting opinions, and 147

23 The court of appeals vote data are from the Songer court of appeals database as corrected in
Landes and Posner, note 4 above. We exclude Roberts, Souter, and Thomas because the database
contains very few votes by them. Thomas had 15 votes, Souter 3, and Roberts zero.
24 We estimated the fraction of active Rs in a circuit by averaging the yearly fractions for the pe‐
riods in which the judge served. Since circuit composition changes over a judge’s tenure, we do
not know how close the sampled votes match the average circuit composition. Nor can we match
the panel composition to the judge’s votes; the panel composition of the cases in our sample in
which he voted might differ from the average circuit composition.
25 Our initial court of appeals sample consisted of 500 cases randomly selected from volumes 888
to 921 of Westlaw. These volumes mainly include opinions for the year 1990. We excluded 67 cas‐
es that were not from 1990, 21 duplicate cases, and 8 that were not decided in a published opinion
but merely listed. These adjustments left 404 cases in our sample.
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(33.0 percent) with one or more concurring opinions.26 Table 3 reveals that a Su‐
preme Court majority opinion tends to be longer if there is one dissenting opi‐
nion and even longer if there is more than one. The differences are statistically
significant for both the full sample and the 335 orally argued signed opinions
when we combine all three years, and significant in most cases for in the indi‐
vidual years.
Table 3
A problem in interpreting the data in Table 3 is that the difficulty or impor‐
tance of a case is likely to influence both the length of the majority opinion and
the presence and number of dissents. To try to isolate the effect of dissent on
length we regress length on dissent, importance, and other factors that may in‐
fluence length:
(6)
Wsc = f(Oral, Dissent_1, Dissent_2, Mention, Concur, Term,
Subject, Importance, u)
Wsc equals the number of words (including words in footnotes) in the Su‐
preme Courtʹs majority opinion; Oral=1 if there was both an oral argument and a
signed opinion ; Dissent_1=1 if there is one dissenting opinion and Dissent_2=1 if
there is more than one dissenting opinion; Mention=1 if the majority opinion
mentions the dissent; Concur=1 if there is a concurring opinion. Term consists of
dummy variables denoting the term of the court (1963, 1980, or 1990); Subject
consists of dummy variables denoting subject matter (such as civil liberties or
economics); Importance identifies the importance of the case; and u is the residual.
We proxy importance by the number of Supreme Court and court of appeals cita‐
tions to the opinion. The average number of citations, in both the Supreme Court
and the courts of appeals, to majority opinions in Supreme Court cases decided
in a signed opinion is 172, compared to 32 for the other opinions, and is 154 for
the majority opinions when there is a dissent compared to 114 when there is not.
Majority opinions in orally argued cases are both longer (see Table 3) and more
likely to attract a dissent (62 percent, compared to 52 percent for all other opi‐
nions).
Table 4
26 The percentage of dissents—58.8—is different from our earlier figure of 62 percent. That figure
was based on all cases decided between 1952 and 2008, while the smaller is based on our sample
for just three terms: 1963, 1980, and 1990.
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Table 4 contains our regression estimates. Oral is the most significant varia‐
ble in regression (4.1), indicating that opinions in orally argued cases are nearly
3000 words longer than other opinions. Turning to equation (4.2), which restricts
the sample to the 335 orally argued cases decided by signed opinions, one dis‐
senting opinion increases the length of the majority opinion by more than 1,000
words, but only if the majority mentions the dissent. If not, the effect is still posi‐
tive [plus 277 words], but statistically insignificant.27 When there are two or more
dissenting opinions, not only is the majority opinion over 1000 words longer, but
the difference is statistically significant whether or not the majority mentions the
dissent, although a mention adds between 700 and 900 words to the majority
opinion, depending on the equation.
The importance of the case, as proxied by Supreme Court citations to the ma‐
jority opinion, has a positive and highly significant effect on the length of majori‐
ty opinions in both equations (4.1) and (4.2). Citations in the courts of appeals to
the Supreme Court majority opinion, however, have no significant effect on the
length of the majority opinion. This is puzzling, since appellate court citations
are an even better measure of the importance or influence of a Supreme Court
decision than citations by the Court. The Court isn’t bound by its prior decisions,
so it doesn’t matter terribly which ones it cites. The court of appeals is bound. A
possible explanation for why Supreme Court citations to majority opinions are
significant indicators of the importance of a case but court of appeals citations to
Supreme Court majority opinions are not is that the Supreme Court is more con‐
cerned with and attuned to the impact of its decisions as precedents guiding fu‐
ture decisions than it is with their impact on the courts of appeals; and the Court
may also have an imperfect awareness of how its decisions influence those
courts.
Neither the concurrence nor the subject‐matter variables are significant in
any regression. The fact that concurring opinions do not result in longer majority
opinions may seem surprising, since such opinions often reflect disagreement
with the majority’s reasoning. Often, however, they do not reflect disagreement;
they may address a point that the majority opinion omitted because it did not
command a majority of the Justices, or they may criticize a dissent (“riding shot‐
gun” as it were for the majority opinion).
The time dummy variables are highly significant, indicating that majority
opinions were longer in both the 1980 and 1990 terms. This suggests that as the
number of cases declined from 179 in 1963 to 143 in 1980 to 124 in 1990, the Su‐
preme Court wrote longer majority opinions.
27 Dissent_1 and Mention are jointly significant at the p < .01 level in equation (4.1) and at p < .05
the .05 level in equation (4.2).
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Table 5 presents data on the length of opinions in the courts of appeals. On
average, majority opinions are 41 percent longer when there is a dissent. To cor‐
rect for differences in importance between cases that do and do not draw a dis‐
sent, we divide our sample into reversals and affirmances. Since reversals are
more likely to involve difficult issues (otherwise the court of appeals presumably
would have reached the same decision as the lower court), we expect reversals to
produce longer majority opinions and more dissents. Table 5 shows that opi‐
nions reversing are indeed typically longer than opinions affirming and more
likely to draw a dissent (9.6 percent versus 6.5 percent).28 And they are longer
still if there is a dissent: in the reversal sample about 26 percent and in the affir‐
mance sample 54 percent longer if there is a dissent. The reason for this differ‐
ence is unclear, but may reflect increasing marginal effort cost, since reversal
opinions are longer than affirmance opinions even when there is no dissent.
Table 5
To better isolate the impact of a dissent on the length of the majority opinion,
we estimate the following multiple regression equation:
(7) WCA = f(Dissent, Reverse, First, Caseload, Circuit, Civil or Area, u)
where W (=the length of the majority opinion in the court of appeals); Dissent (=1
if there is a dissent); Reverse (=1 if the lower court decision is reversed); First (=1 if
the case is decided for the first time and 0 if it is decided after rehearing or re‐
mand to the lower court or from the Supreme Court);29 Caseload (=caseload per
judge in the circuit);30 Circuit is a set of dummy variables that denote the circuit
in which the case was heard; and a subject‐matter variable (either Civil =1 for a
civil and 0 for a criminal case or Area, which consists of six dummy variables de‐
noting respectively a criminal, civil rights, labor, economic activity and regula‐
tion, due process, privacy, or first amendment case). We expect positive regres‐
sion coefficients on the Dissent, Reverse and First (there are likely to be more is‐
sues to discuss when a case is heard the first than the second time) variables and
a negative coefficient on the Caseload variable (the greater the caseload per judge,
28 The difference in words is significant at the .01 level but the difference in dissents only at the
.10 level.
29 In our sample, 949 cases were decided for the first time, 9 on re‐hearing, 20 after remand to the
lower court, 9 on remand from the Supreme Court, and 32 were noted as other (plus 2 as not as‐
certained). We assigned the value 1 only to the 949 cases decided for the first time.
30 Caseload equals the number of appellate cases terminated on the merits in 1990 divided by the
sum of active judges and senior status judges (weighted by the number of cases terminated by a
senior judge relative to an active judge) in 1990.
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the less time available for writing opinions and therefore the shorter the opi‐
nion). We include Circuit variables to account for circuit‐specific factors (such as
different circuit rules or norms on publication of opinions or opinion writing gen‐
erally) that might affect the length of published opinions. We add subject‐matter
variables to allow for the possibility that the type of case will influence the length
of the majority opinion. Table 6 contains our regression results.
Table 6
Consistent with our predictions, the Dissent, Reverse, and First variables have
positive and highly significant impacts on the length of majority opinions. We
cannot reject the hypothesis in equations 6.1 and 6.2 that a dissent adds roughly
the same number of words (about 1380) to a majority opinion as the combined
effect of a reversal (654 words) and of the decision being the first decision in the
litigation (about 820 words). The circuit’s caseload has a significant negative ef‐
fect of the length of the majority opinion. For example, an increase in the casel‐
oad from a low of 66.8 cases per judge (the D.C. circuit) to 130.1 cases per judge
(the mean of all circuits) reduces the average number of words in a majority opi‐
nion by 468. (However, raw caseload figures do not reflect differences in the av‐
erage difficulty of cases across circuits; we have not attempted an adjustment for
difficulty.) The circuit dummy variables are jointly significant in both regressions
6.1 and 6.2, but only the Second and Eighth circuits produce shorter, and the
Third Circuit longer, opinions than the other circuits, holding constant circuit ca‐
seload, subject matter, and other variables. We find no significant effects of case
type (either the civil or subject area variables) on opinion length.
B. The Benefits of Dissent
We estimate the benefits of dissenting by comparing case citations to majori‐
ty and to dissenting opinions. We assume that the more citations to an opinion,
the greater its influence is likely to be in shaping the law and therefore the great‐
er the benefit to the author of the opinion.31 Table 7 summarizes the number of
citations in Supreme Court and court of appeals opinions to majority and dis‐
senting opinions of the Supreme Court.
Table 7

31 A large and growing literature uses number of citations to measure the influence of judicial
opinions and judges. See, for example, James H. Fowler, et al. ʺNetwork Analysis and the Law:
Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court,ʺ 15 Political Analysis
324 (2007).

Why (and When) Judges Dissent

18

Although there are famous examples of Supreme Court dissents that later
became the law, the average Supreme Court dissent is not heavily cited, even in
the lower courts. Table 7 shows that a dissenting opinion in cases decided by the
Court during the 1963, 1980, or 1990 terms was cited on average only .24 times by
the Supreme Court and 1.54 times by the courts of appeals. There are, of course,
many more court of appeals decisions than Supreme Court decisions, so this ra‐
tio is not interesting. If anything, lower court judges are less likely to cite Su‐
preme Court dissents than Supreme Court Justices are, because lower courts are
rigidly bound to follow majority rulings by the Supreme Court. Indeed, this is
suggested by another ratio: the ratio of citations to Supreme Court majority opi‐
nions to citations to a dissenting opinion (in cases in which there is one dissent‐
ing opinion): the ratio is 32 to 1 in the Supreme Court and 94 to 1 in the courts of
appeals. Of the 206 Supreme Court opinions in which there was one dissent, 175
of the dissents were never cited by the Supreme Court and 108 never cited by the
courts of appeals. When there are two or more dissenting opinions, dissents are
cited more frequently, but still rarely; the ratios are 19 to 1 in the Supreme Court
and 49 to 1 in the courts of appeals.
In Table 8 we see that the more frequently the majority opinion is cited, the
more frequently the dissent is cited, and also that there are more citations in the
courts of appeals to Supreme Court dissents when the majority opinion mentions
the dissent and when the number of dissenting Justices is greater; but this effect
is not found in the Supreme Court.
Table 8
As shown in Table 9, dissents in the courts of appeals opinions are almost
never cited in those courts (we have not examined citations by other courts to
court of appeals opinions). The mean (and median) number of citations to a dis‐
sent is .138 (and 0) both within and outside the circuit, whereas majority opinions
in cases in which there is a dissent are cited an average of 13.2 times inside and
5.3 times outside the circuit; the medians are 7 and 3.5 respectively.32 (Of the 80
dissenting opinions in our court of appeals sample, 72 were never cited inside
the circuit and 75 were never cited outside the circuit.) There thus appears to be
only a very slight payoff to a court of appeals judge (except from the utility he
receives from expressing his disagreement with the majority) from writing a dis‐
sent, since its impact on the law, at least as proxied by citations, is close to zero.

32 There is a positive relationship between citations to dissenting and majority opinions, but it is
weak and not statistically significant.
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Table 9
There is, however, a possible benefit from writing a dissent that we have not
considered. It is widely believed that the Supreme Court is more likely to grant
certiorari (that is, decide to hear the case and decide it on the merits) when there
is a dissent in the lower court. We can test this hypothesis because the cert‐pool
memos prepared by the Justices’ clerks indicate whether there was a dissent. Ta‐
ble 10, which is based on a random sample of 683 petitions that were granted and
a complete set of 693 in the 1986 to 1994 terms from cases in the courts of appeals,
reveals that almost 21 percent of the petitions that sought review of a decision in
which there was a dissenting opinion were granted, compared to fewer than 3
percent where there was no dissent. But the probability that certiorari will be
granted in a case in which there was a dissent is still so low—about .08—that the
effect of dissenting may not supply a strong incentive to dissent, though this de‐
pends on the cost of dissent.
Table 10

C. Dissent Rates in Circuits
We expect that the dissent rate in a circuit will be lower, the greater the
number of judges in the circuit, the greater their workload, and the narrower the
ideological differences among the judges. A greater number of judges lowers the
collegiality cost of dissenting; a lighter workload lowers the opportunity cost of
dissenting; and a narrower range of ideological differences reduces the number
of occasions to dissent. To test these hypotheses, we estimate regressions based
on data on dissent rates in the 12 regional circuits (the federal circuit is excluded)
for the period 1990–2006. We measure the dissent rate by the number of dissents
reported in Lexis divided by the number of cases terminated on the merits;33 the
number of judges by the number of active judges plus the number of senior
judges34 (adjusted downward by the ratio of the average number of cases in
which a senior judge participates to the number in which an active judge partici‐
pates); the workload by cases terminated on the merits divided by the number of
judges (active plus adjusted senior status);35 and ideological differences by the
33 We also measured the dissent rate from West data. There are some small differences between
the West and Lexis dissent numbers but the correlation between the two exceeds .98.
34 Judges who reach retirement age can continue to sit, as much or as little as they want, in lieu of
retirement; and most do continue sitting, though with a lighter caseload.
35 Caseload is an imperfect measure of workload because cases are not uniform with respect to
the time and effort required to dispose of a case. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
calculates and publishes weighted‐caseload statistics for the district courts, but not for the courts
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standard deviation of the ideology (proxied as usual by R and D) of the judges in
the circuit.36 We also include dummy year variables and cluster the observations
by circuit. All variables are in logarithms except for the year variables. The dis‐
sent rate averages about 2.8 percent over the 1990–2006 period and ranges from a
high of 4.8 percent in the Sixth Circuit to a low of 1.1 percent in the Eleventh Cir‐
cuit. These rates understate the percentage of opinions with dissents because
some appeals are terminated without an opinion.
Table 11 reveals that the dissent rate is positively and significantly related to
the number of judges and the ideological difference among judges in the circuit,
and negatively and statistically related to the circuit’s caseload. The effects are
large. For example, a 10 percent increase in the number of judges in a circuit in‐
creases the dissent rate by about 6.5 percent and a 10 percent increase in the ca‐
seload per judge decreases the dissent rate by about 7 percent.
Table 11
The dissent rate in the courts of appeals has declined by about 2.5 percent
per year, from about 3.4 percent in 1990–1992 to 2.4 percent in the 2005–2007.
This is consistent with their increasing caseload over this period. For example,
the mean number of cases terminated on the merits per active judge has in‐
creased from an average of 155.4 in the 1990–1992 period to 205.1 in the 2005–
2007.37
D. Splitting the Fifth Circuit in 1982
In 1982 the Fifth Circuit was divided into the Fifth and the newly created
Eleventh Circuit. Before the split, the Fifth had 25 judges. After the split, it had 13
judges and the Eleventh Circuit had 12 judges. Since the collegiality cost asso‐
ciated with dissenting is greater the smaller the circuit, we would expect the
sharp drop in the number judges in the Fifth Circuit to have led to a reduction in
the frequency of dissents. And because the collegiality cost would be roughly the
same in the newly created Eleventh Circuit, the combined Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits should have a lower overall dissent rate than the Fifth before it was di‐
vided. That is what we find (see Figure 2). The average dissent rate in the Fifth
of appeals. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 227–236 (1996), calculates
weight‐caseload statistics for the courts of appeals for 1993. This falls within our sample period,
but we have not calculated weighted caseloads for the other years in the sample.
36 To measure ideology, we use the Judicial Common Space (scores. See Michael W. Giles, Vir‐
ginia A. Hettinger, and Todd Peppers, ʺPicking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan
Selection Agendas,ʺ 54 Political Research Quarterly 623 (2001); Lee Epstein, et al., ”The Judicial
Common Space,” 23 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 303 (2007).
37 The mean is an unweighted average of the caseload in the individual circuits.

Why (and When) Judges Dissent

21

Circuit was 3.6 percent from 1971 to 1982 and 1.7 percent from 1983 to 2007, and
the difference is significant at the .001 level. The average dissent rate was 1.7 per‐
cent in the Eleventh Circuit, and 1.7 percent in the combined Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits.
Figure 2
A closer look at the data, however, suggests that the decline in the dissent
rate after 1982 was not caused by a reduction in circuit size but instead by a sig‐
nificant increase in the average caseload (see Figure 3), which increased the cost
of dissenting. Although there were 25 judges in the Fifth Circuit before the split,
10 had been appointed in 1980, so that for most of the period before the split the
number of judges (15) was only slightly greater than the number (13) afterward.
It is implausible, therefore, to attribute the sharp drop in the dissent rate in the
1982 to 2007 period to the small drop in the number of judges. Regression analy‐
sis confirms this. We find a significant decrease in the dissent rate associated
with an increase in the caseload, but no significant effect of changes in the num‐
ber of judges.38
Figure 3
E. Dissents and Concurrences in the Supreme Court
The economic theory of judicial behavior predicts that a decline in the judi‐
cial workload would lower the opportunity cost of dissenting and increase the
frequency of dissents, and also that the greater the ideological heterogeneity
among judges the more likely they are to disagree and so the higher the dissent
rate will be. We expect similar effects for concurring opinions. To test these hy‐
potheses, we estimate regressions from annual data on Supreme Court cases for
the 1953 to 2008 terms.
Table 12 presents our results. The dependent variable is the number of dis‐
senting opinions divided by the number of cases (eq. 12.1); and the number of
concurring opinions divided by the number of cases (eq. 12.2).39 To illustrate, if
the court decides 100 cases and in 40 there is one dissenting opinion, in 20 two,
38 The regressions is D = .062*** ‐ .0002 (C/J)*** ‐ .0003 J
R2 = .74
(7.67)
(10.07)
(0.80)
where D= dissent rate, C/J = caseload, and J=number of judges. *** indicates p < .001.
39 We also estimated regressions using alternative dependent variables, such as the fraction of
cases with at least one dissenting opinion (which does not distinguish between a case with one
and a case with two or more dissenting opinions), the average number of dissenting votes per
opinions, and the fraction of cases with one or more concurring opinions. The results were simi‐
lar to those reported here.
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and in 5 three, there are 95 dissenting opinions in all, hence .95 dissenting opi‐
nions per case. The independent variables include the number of decisions after
oral argument (86 percent of the total), which we call the “caseload” variable; the
number of other decisions (the “other cases” variable) (decisions in nonargued
cases plus a small number of decisions in original as distinct from appealed cases
and a few cases decided by an equally divided vote); an estimate of ideological
heterogeneity (the standard deviation of Segal‐Cover ideology scores); and a
time trend variable that accounts for combined effects on dissents of other factors
(e.g., the rise in opinions dissenting from denial of certiorari, word processing
and electronic research, and the number of law clerks). Finally, we add a dummy
variable for the 1953–1955 terms because of an inexplicably small number of opi‐
nions in the first three years of our data (50 percent below 1956 and subsequent
years) for both cases with and without oral argument.40
We find that the number of decisions in argued cases (the caseload variable
that we emphasize) has a significant negative impact on the fraction of dissenting
opinions. Since both the dissent and caseload variables are in logarithms, the re‐
gression coefficient indicates that a 10 percent decrease in the caseload increases
the dissent rate by about 3.3 percent. We also find that the greater the ideological
heterogeneity of the Justices, the greater the increase in dissenting opinions. Of
the remaining variables, only the 1953–1955 dummy variable is significant. We
have no explanation for why the effect of that variable is negative and relatively
large, indicating about a 35 percent drop in the dissent rate although this is offset
by the negative coefficient on the caseload variable, so that the net effect on the
dissent rate is close zero in the 1953–1995 time period.
Equation (12.2,) reveals a significant positive time trend of the frequency of
concurring—a 1.7 percent increase per year. We find no significant effect of the
caseload on concurring opinions, but, surprisingly, a significant positive effect
associated with an increase in “other cases.” We have no explanation for this
finding.

IV. CONCLUSION
40 To illustrate, the number of opinions after oral argument is 84 (1953), 93 (1954), and 98 (1955),
compared to 121 (1956), 127 (1957), and between 101 and 153 over the next 15 years. The number
of other decisions is 4 (1953), 5 (1954), and 6 (1955), followed by 6 (1956), 28 (1957), and between
11 and 75 over the next 15 years. A possible explanation for the reduction in 1953 to 1955 is that
right before the start of the 1953 term, on September 8, Chief Justice Vinson died suddenly; War‐
ren took the oath of office on the first day of the term. The Court probably wasnʹt up to speed on
cert. grants. Then there was Brown, which was scheduled for reargument on December 9, 1953,
and took a great deal of the Courtʹs time. As 1954, Jackson died at the start of the term and wasnʹt
replaced until March 1955.
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This paper is a contribution to a growing literature, at the intersection of law,
economics, and political science, that seeks to explain judicial behavior by means
of a realistic model of a judge’s utility function, and to test the explanation em‐
pirically, exploiting a rich body of statistics primarily concerning the federal
courts. The question we ask in this paper is why and when appellate judges, both
federal court of appeals judges and U.S. Supreme Court Justices, dissent. The
traditional answer given by the legal profession—the “legalistic” as distinct from
“realistic” answer—is that a judge dissents when he disagrees with the majority.
But such an answer depends on an inadequate understanding of judges’ incen‐
tives. We show that a realistic conception of such incentives predicts “dissent
aversion” in the circumstances prevailing in the courts of appeals, but not in the
circumstances prevailing in the Supreme Court. The reasons for the difference
have to do with differences in the costs and benefits of dissent in the two courts.
These costs and benefits that are a function in turn of workload (which increases
the time cost of dissenting), the costs in impaired collegiality from frequent dis‐
senting (which is related in turn to the size of the court), the likelihood that a dis‐
sent will influence the future course of the law, the ideological composition of the
court, the importance of a case (which can be proxied by citations to the majority
opinion), and the degree to which the court adheres to precedent. We find that
the predictions generated by our theory of judicial behavior are generally well
supported by the data, though there are unresolved puzzles that provide an
agenda for future research.
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FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1
Fraction of Cases with One or More Dissenting Votes in the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court, 2007
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Figure 2
Ratio of Dissents to Cases Terminated on the Merits in the 5th and 11th Circuits
(1971–2007)
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Figure 3
Caseload in the 5th and 11th Circuits
(1971–2007)

Note: Caseload= terminations on the merits/number of judges.
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Table 1
Dissents as Function of Willingness to Dissent, Ideological
Differences, and Court Composition

Court
Make‐
Up

R
(1)
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2

D
(2)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Fraction of
Opportunities
to Dissent in
Circuit

R
(3)
.018
.055
.109
.181
.272
.382
.509
.655
.818

D
(4)
.818
.655
.509
.382
.272
.181
.109
.055
.018

Fraction of
Dissenting
Votes

Fraction of Cases with a
Dissenting Vote

CR=.7

CR=.7

CR=.6

CD=.3

CD=.3

CD=.4

=.25

=.25

=.25

=.10

R
(5)
.002
.006
.011
.018
.027
.038
.051
.066
.082

D
(6)
.082
.066
.051
.038
.027
.018
.011
.006
.002

All
(7)
.045
.062
.073
.079
.082
.079
.073
.062
.045

All
(8)
.009
.012
.015
.0159
.0163
.0159
.015
.012
.009

=25

All
(9)
.023
.031
.034
.040
.041
.040
.034
.031
.023

=1

All
(10)
.091
.123
.145
.159
.163
.159
.145
.123
.091

Note: R = number of judges appointed by a Republican president; D = number
of judges appointed by a Democratic president; CR = fraction of conservative
votes of judges appointed by a Republican president; CD= fraction of conserva‐
tive votes by judges appointed by a Democratic president; and  = fraction of
times a judge will dissent when the other two judges on the panel were ap‐
pointed by a president of the opposing party.
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Table 2
Ideological Voting and Ideological Preferences
Court
Make‐
Up
R
(1)
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2

D
(2)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Fraction of Conservative Votes by Judges Appointed by
President of Same or Different Party Assuming True
Ideological Preferences are CR=.7 and CD=.3
=0

VR
(3)
.693
.678
.656
.628
.591
.547
.496
.438
.372

=.25

VD
(4)
.627
.562
503
.453
408
.372
.344
.322
.307

VR
(5)
.694
.684
.667
.646
.618
.585
.547
.503
.455

VD
(6)
.545
.497
.453
.414
.382
.354
.333
.317
.305

=.50

VR
(7)
.696
.689
.678
.664
.646
.624
.598
.569
.536

VD
(8)
.464
.431
.402
.376
.354
.336
.322
.311
.304

=1

VR
(9)
.7
.7
.7
.7
.7
.7
.7
.7
.7

VD
(10)
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3

Note: R = number of judges appointed by a Republican president; D = number
of judges appointed by a Democratic president; CR = true ideological preference
for conservative votes of R‐appointed judge; CD= true ideological preference for
conservative votes of a D‐appointed judge; VR = observed fraction of conserva‐
tive votes of R‐appointed judge; VD = observed fraction of conservative votes of
D‐appointed judge; and  = fraction of times a judge will dissent when the oth‐
er two judges on the panel were appointed by a president of the opposing par‐
ty.
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Table 3
Words in Majority Opinions
Supreme Court Cases: 1963, 1980 and 1990
(Number of Cases in Parentheses)
All Cases
Year
0
1963
(179)
1980
(143)
1990
(124)
All
Years
(446)

2337
(72)
4530
(54)
3564
(54)
3362
(180)

Orally Argued Signed Opinions

No. Dissents
1
2 or
More
2399
(84)
5527
(71)
4536*
(51)
4006*
(206)

4206*
(23)
5570
(18)
5884*
(19)
5146*
(60)

Note: * p < .05 compared to 0 dissents.

0
3432
(44)
5307
(41)
4376
(42)
4308
(127)

No. Dissents
1
2 or More
4059
(48)
6082
(62)
4687
(49)
5041*
(159)

5624*
(17)
6910
(14)
6130*
(18)
6177*
(49)
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Table 4
Regression Analysis of Words in Supreme Court
Majority Opinions: 1960, 1983 and 1990
(t‐Statistics in Parentheses)

Oral
Dissent_1
Dissent_2
Mention
SC Cites
CA Cites
Concur
1980 Term
1990 Term
Subject Matter
Constant
R2
No. Observa‐
tions

Eq. 4.1

Eq. 4.2

2924***
(10.17)
141
(0.58)
913*
(2.51)
867*
(2.63)
91.6***
(7.63)
‐0.721
(1.51)
75.6
(0.32)
1751***
(6.52)
957**
(3.29)
Yes
308
(0.72)

‐
277
(0.87)
1357**
(2.93)
725
(1.86)
93.8***
(6.88)
‐0.823
(1.52)
76.1
(0.26)
2056***
(5.87)
1202***
(3.29)
Yes
2673***
(4.66)

.49

.23

446

335

Notes: (1) * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. (2) SC Cites denotes
citations in subsequent Supreme Cases to the majority opinion
and CA Cites denotes citations in subsequent court of appeals
opinions to the majority opinion.
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Table 5
Words in Majority Opinions
U.S. Court of Appeals, 1989–1991
(Number of Cases in Parentheses)
Dissent
No
Yes
All

All

Reversed

Affirmed

3354
(945)
4733*
(80)
3462
(1025)

3799
(387)
4774*
(41)
3893
(428)

3046
(558)
4690*
(39)
3153
(597)

Notes: (1) * the difference in the length of majority opinions with and without a
dissent is significant at p < .05. (2) Reversals include reversed, reversed in part
and vacated decisions.
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Table 6
Regression Analysis of Words in Majority Opinions
U.S. Court of Appeals, 1989–1991
(t‐Statistics in Parentheses)
Independent Variables

Eq. 6.1

Eq. 6.2

Dissent

1384***
(4.65)

1382***
(4.54)

Reversal

654***
(4.44)

654***
(4.33)

First

819**
(2.73)

822**
(2.70)

Civil

139
(0.99)

‐

Caseload

–7.34**

–7.45**

(2.49)

(2.46)

Circuit Dummies

Yes***

Yes***

Subject Area Dummies

No

Yes

Constant

3829***
(6.71)

3812***
(6.52)

R2

.11

.12

Notes: (1) (1) * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (2) All regressions have
1025 observations and use robust standard errors.
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Table 7
Citations in Majority and Dissenting Opinions to 266 Supreme
Opinions with Dissents
1963, 1980 and 1990

Opinion
One Dissenting Opinion
Majority
One Dissent
Ratio
Two or More Dissenting
Opinions
Majority
Two or More Dissents
Ratio

SC Citations

Ct. Appeals
Citations
Mean
Median

Mean

Median

7.81
0.24
32.1

5
0
‐

144.96
1.54
94.2

60
0
‐

9.93
0.53
18.6

6
0
‐

146.97
3.00
49.0

87
1.5
‐

Note: There were 206 opinions with one dissent and 60 with two or
more dissents. In the former group, 175 dissenting opinions had 0 Su‐
preme Court citations and 108 dissenting opinions had 0 court of ap‐
peals citations. In the latter group, 38 had 0 Supreme court citations
and 17 had zero court of appeals citations. In contrast, of the 266 major‐
ity opinions (with dissenting opinions) 34 had 0 Supreme Court cita‐
tions and 19 had 0 court of appeals citations.
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Table 8
Regression Analysis of Citations to Dissenting Opinions in Majority
Opinions in the 1963, 1980 and 1990 Terms
SC Cites

CA Cites

SC cites to maj.
opinion

.012**
(2.77)

‐

CA cites to maj.
opinion

‐

.002**
(2.90)

Orally Signed

.077
(0.64)

.640
(1.32)

2 or more dis.
opinions

.228*
(2.05)

.837
(1.75)

Mention

‐.025
(0.23)

.968*
(2.06)

No. dissenting
votes

.038
(0.83)

.415*
(2.09)

1980 Term

.266*
(2.42)

.536
(1.14)

1990 Term

.149
(1.19)

.646
(1.21)

Constant

‐.120
(0.93)

‐.803
(1.45)

.08

.15

266

266

R2
No. Observations

Notes: (1) * p < .05, ** p < .01 (2) We also estimated regressions to Majority Opinions
but do not report them here. In the regressions, signed opinions in orally argued cases
had a positive and significant effect on both Supreme Court and court of appeals cita‐
tions. The only other significant variables were the 1980 and 1990 variables, which had
positive and significant (at least one in each regression) effects.
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Table 9
Citations to 82 Court of Appeals Published Opinions in 1990 with Dissents
Inside Circuit
Mean
Median
13.188
7
0.138
0
95.9
‐

Opinion
Majority
Dissent
Ratio

Outside Circuit
Mean
Median
5.338
3.5
0.1375
0
38.8
‐

Note: There is a weak but statistically insignificant positive relationship between cites to
dissenting and majority opinions.

Table 10
Cert Petitions Denied and Granted in the 1986 to
1994 Terms from Cases in the Court of Appeals
Cert Denied
(N=683)
Cert Granted
(N=693)
N

No Dissent
.569

Dissent
.222

.431

.778

1088

288
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Table 11
Regression Analysis of Log Dissent Rates in
Circuits: 1991–2006
(t‐Ratios in Parentheses)
L.Judges (adjusted)
L.Caseload (adjusted)
L.Std.Dev. Ideology
Year Dummies
Year

Eq. (11.1)

Eq. (11.2)

.634***

.676***

(3.88)

(3.65)

‐.685**

‐.714**

(2.98)

(3.06)

.584*

.689*

(2.09)

(2.51)

No

Yes***

‐.037***

‐

(4.52)
Constant

72.34***

‐1.168

(4.44)

(1.14)

R2

.47

.49

No. Observations

204

204

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 12
Regression Analysis of Log Dissent and Concurrence Rates in the
Supreme Court: 1956–2008
(t‐Ratios in Parentheses)
Log (Total No.
Dissenting Opinions/
No. Opinions)
(Eq. 12.1)

Log (Total No.
Concurring Opinions/
No. Opinions)
(Eq. 12.2)

–.330*

–.059

(2.52)

(0.29)

–.015

.211**

(0.45)

(3.10)

.596***
(3.95)

.307
(0.93)

–.004

.017**

(1.94)

(3.18)

–.351***

–.360

(3.63)

(1.64)

8.867*

–33.912**

(2.02)

(2.99)

R2

.34

.70

No. Observations

56

56

Log Caseload
Log Other Cases
Ideological Differences
Time
Dummy 1953–1955
Constant

Notes: (1) * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (2) All regressions have 56 observations and
use robust standard errors. (3) Variable Definitions: Caseload = Opinions with oral
argument; Other Cases= Per curiam pinions without oral argument, decrees and cases
decided by equally divided vote; Ideological Differences = the standard deviation of
Segal‐Cover scores; Time= trend variable; and Dummy 1953–1955= 1 for the 1953–1955
terms and 0 otherwise.
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